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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES

Pursuant to Rule 24 (a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
undersigned counsel for appellees represent that the named parties, MontfordApollo Sugarhouse, L.P. and Guy L. Thomas, are the parties to this interlocutory
appeal. That the parties Montford Apollo Sugarhouse, L.P., The Brown Bear
International Corporation, Michael Brown and Guy L. Thomas, are and have been
the only parties to the litigation.
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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This is an interlocutory appeal from an award of Attorney's fees in favor
of Plaintiff-Appellee, Montford-Apollo Sugarhouse, L.P. and against DefendantAppellant, Guy Thomas pursuant to an Order dated December 26, 1998 by the
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki.

EL

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON REVIEW

1. Did the District Court commit reversible error in awarding attorneys fees
prior to the entry of final judgment by the District Court?
2. Did the District court abuse its discretion in awarding unreasonable
attorneys fees to Plaintiff-Appellee in the amount of $5,488.00 forfees
allegedly incurredfor the preparation of a summary judgment motion.
3. Did the District Court, in awarding unreasonable attorneys fees to
Appellee, violate Appellant Thomases rightof equal protection of the law as
guaranteed by Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution and the 14**
Amendment of the United States Constitution.

ffl, APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The applicable standard of with respect to the issue appears to be de novo (as
purely a question of law). "[A] ppellate review of a Court's determination of the
law is usually characterized by the term 'correctness.'" State v. Pena. 869 P.2d
932, 936(Utah 1994); "correctness" means "the appellate court decides the matter
for itself and does not defer to any degree to the trial judge's determination of the
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law." Id: State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); Steffensen v.. Smith's
Management Corp.. 820 P.2d 482, 490 (Utah App. 1991); Knapstad v. Smith's
Management Corp.. 774 P.2d 1,2 (Utah App. 1989).
Additionally, the applicable standard of appellate review in this case, for the
issues stated appears to be abuse of discretion. State v. Wetzel 868 P.2d 64, 67
(Utah 1993); Nav v. General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Utah 1993).

IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Appellant, Guy Thomas, was the owner of a business in the Sugarhouse
area. Co-Defendant, Michael Brown, owned a small restaurant, which was also in
the Sugarhouse area, called the Brown Bear. Mr. Brown was a Utah Jazz player
and was traded. Subsequently, he no longer was interested in maintaining the
restaurant, and began to look for someone to sublet the space. Mr. Thomas
became aware of the opportunity, and submitted a business proposal to the
landlords, Sugarhouse Development Partnership. This business plan outlined
plans for a restaurant specializing in gourmet coffees and chicken wings. The
business plan was approved and the parties negotiated an Assignment/Lease
Extension Agreement. Following the execution of this lease, Sugarhouse
Development Partnership negotiated a lease agreement on the space directly next
to Mr. Thomas' new business. This business was also a gourmet coffee shop,
Moxie Java.

Further, the space leased to Moxie Java did not have bathroom

facilities, therefore, a hole was punched through to Mr. Thomas' space, so that
Moxie Java's patrons could use his facilities. Sugarhouse Development
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Partnership declared bankruptcy and was purchased by the Plaintiff/Appellee,
Montford-Apollo.
Following the entrance of the competitive shop, Mr. Thomas' business
declined rapidly. He approached the new landlord, Montford-Apollo seeking
release from his lease. He searched for and presented several candidates that were
willing and capable to assume the lease, but all were rejected by
Plaintiff/Appellee Montford Apollo. Mr. Thomas could no longer afford the
lease amount on his failed business. Montford Apollo filed suit against Mr.
Thomas for the lease amount.
On April 9, 1996, Defendant/Appellant, Guy Thomas, by and though his
attorney of record, filed an answer to Plaintiffs complaint.

On June 18, 1996,

after doing initial research, Defendant submitted their First set of Admissions,
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to Plaintiff-Appellee
Montford Apollo, in which Defendant/Appellant addressed the issue of lack of
good faith and fair dealing. In their answers to said Admissions and
Interrogatories, Plaintiff/Appellee avoided all issues involving good faith,
presumably because Defendant/Appellant had stated "you" in their questions,
rather than "you and/or your predecessors".
On July 9, 1996, Plaintiff-Appellee submitted a set of Request for
Admissions, Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to
Defendant/Appellant Guy Thomas. Mr. Thomas was out of the Country for a
period during this time and counsel for Defendant/Appellant was unavailable to
answer all of the questions, without conferring with Mr. Thomas. Counsel for
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Defendant/appellant spoke with Plaintiff/Appellee's counsel on several occasions
confirming that we would supply the answers as soon as possible
In August 1996, Plaintiff/Appellee supplemented their answers responding to
the original questions brought by the Defendant in relationship to good faith and
fair dealings issues.
Although it had been three months since the requests were served upon
Defendant-Appellant, Plaintiff-Appellee had not indicated that there was a
problem waiting for the overdue answers, nor did Plaintiff file a Motion to
Compel these answers. It is assumed that the Plaintiff-Appellee wanted the
Requests for Admissions to be deemed admitted, therefore, they filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment against Defendant Guy L. Thomas on September 26,
1996, without the answers to their discovery. Defendant was finally able to
complete the Answers to Plaintiff Interrogatories on November 26, 1996 and on
December 9, 1996, Plaintiff and Defendant argued on Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment. It was determined at that time, that Plaintiff would be
granted Summary Judgment only on the unanswered Admissions, and that
Defendant would be allowed to amend their answer to the original complaint to
include the defense of good faith and fair dealings. Further, the Court awarded
fees to Plaintiff in an amount of $350.00 as well as appropriate fees for filing the
Motion for Summary Judgment. However, after Defendant-Defendant-Appellant
and his Counsel were able to speak, most of the Admission would have been
admitted, since they dealt with non-payment of the lease.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
It is the Defendant-Appellant's contention that the District Court abused its
discretion by awarding Appellee attorneys' fees of $5,488.00 and $350.00 prior to
the conclusion of the case. The Court allowed Appellant to amend his answer to
include the defense that Appellee had breached its covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. This breach was based on the fact that Sugarhouse Development
Partnership, Appellee's predecessor in interest, had placed a gourmet coffee
shop, Moxie Java, directly adjacent to Appellants place of business, WOW
Wings. It was established in the Lease Agreement that one of the primary
products of WOW Wings was to be gourmet coffee. This placement of Moxie
Java contributed to the failing of Appellant's business. As a result of this failure,
Appellant Thomas was unable to make his lease payments.
The only way that attorneys' fees can be awarded in the present case is by the
agreement of the parties. This agreement allows for the reimbursement of
attorneys' fees upon a party being "successful". To be successful, it must be
successful in the final outcome. The case is not over and there has been no final
outcome. The award of attorneys fees for Appellee for bringing their motion for
summary judgment is premature, and a serious abuse of discretion of the court.
Without even addressing the appropriateness of the award of attorneys' fees,
the amount given for bringing a "boiler plate" motion for summary judgment is
absurd. $5,488.00 to bring a simple motion for summary judgment for nonpayment under a commercial lease, is unimaginable, especially in view of the
abilities of the attorneys involved, including efficiency. Further, the amount
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normally charged for this type of legal work in this community under similar
circumstances, does not give any basis for this large award of attorneys fees.
It is important to have the courts accessible to all of its citizens.

If Mr.

Thomas is forced to pay this award of attorneys' fees, it will prevent him from
pursuing this case to its final conclusion. This barrier will result in the denial of
equal protection of the law as specified in Article I, Section 24 of the Utah
Constitution and the 14 Amendment of the United States Constitution.

V, ARGUMENT
Point 1.
Did the District Court commit reversible error in awarding attorneys fees prior
to the entry of final judgment by the District Court?
Utah allows the recovery of attorneys' fees either by statute or by agreement of
the parties. Estate of Ouinn. 830 P.2d 282, (Utah App. 1992) which states:
In Utah, attorney fees may only be awarded if authorized by statute
or contract. See, also.g., Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781
P.2d 414, 419-20(Utah 1989) (quoting Turtle Management, Inc.
v.Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982));
Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217,
221
(Utah App. 1990).
In the present case any attorneys fee award must be premised on the terms of
the Lease Agreement. Paragraph 19.02 of the Lease Agreement states,
19.02 Attorney's Fees. In the event that either the Landlord
or the Tenant shall institute any action or proceeding
against the other relating to the provisions of this Lease, or
any default hereunder, then, and in that event, the
unsuccessful party in such action or proceeding agrees to
reimburse the successful party for the reasonable expense
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of such action including reasonable attorneys' fees and
disbursements incurred therein by the successful party.
It would appear that Appellee might be entitled to attorney's fees under the
lease agreement, which is the subject matter of this lawsuit, but only if Appellee is
successful in this action. To be successful, Appellee must prevail by way of a
final judgment. This was pointed out in the case of, General Motors Acceptance
Corp.v. Martinez, 712 P.2d 243, (Utah 1985), where the Court stated:
. . . no judgment has yet been entered on the third-party claims in
compliance with our mandate. No determination has been made as
to the amount of the judgment to be entered, including attorney
fees, if appropriate. Until these and any other pending matters are
resolved by the court below, there has not been a final disposition
of all the respective liabilities and rights of the parties. We see no
reason to address in piecemeal fashion the issues ruled on below.
Burton v. Barken Utah, 696 R2d 1217 (1985).

Since, Appellee is the successor to the author of this lease agreement and must
assume responsibility, any ambiguity will be construed against the Appellee as
maker of the document. 19.02 does not say "partially" successful. It says
successful. The only way to interpret a successful outcome is to allow the case to
come to a conclusion and the Appellee must be successful at that time.

To

determine the success, all claims and defenses including breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, must be determined.
Appellee is entitled to reimbursement of attorneys' fees only if successful in
the final outcome. This has yet to be determined. Appellant Thomas alleges that
Appellee, by and through their predecessor in interest, breached the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing by placing an espresso coffee house, Moxie Java, next
to Defendant Guy Thomas's establishment, especially when, Appellant, in his
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business plan submitted to Plaintiffs predecessors in interest, showed espresso
coffee as one of the two primary products of his business. This business plan was
submitted prior to Mr. Thomas's execution of the assumption of the lease.
Appellant would not have executed the lease assumption knowing that the
Landlord was going to place another business selling one of the two primary
products directly next door.
It is one thing to have another espresso coffee purveyor in the same shopping
center, but another to have that purveyor of espresso coffee placed in the adjacent
space. Landlord's audacity was further compounded, when, it then asked Mr.
Thomas to allow a door to be cut in the wall between Moxie Java and his
business, WOW Wings, to give access to the customers and employees of the
Moxie Java to use Mr. Thomas's establishment's restrooms.
Until this matter is brought to a final disposition in the lower court, any
determination of attorneys fees, even the $350.00 awarded to Plaintiff for the
addition of the new defense in the Amended Answer of Appellant, would be
premature and contrary to the terms of the Lease Agreement authorizing attorneys
fees. See TS 1 Partnership v. Allred877 P.2d 156,(Utah App. 1994)

Point 2.
Did the District court abuse its discretion in awarding unreasonable attorneys
fees to Plaintiff-Appellee in the amount of $5,488.00for fees allegedly
incurredfor the preparation of a summary judgment motion.
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Assuming arguendo, that the District Court, had not committed reversible error
in the premature award of attorney's fees . Did Plaintiff present enough evidence
to determine that the award of attorneys' fees for bringing a summary judgment in
the amount of $5,488.00 was reasonable. There are several factors, which should
be used in the determination of whether attorneys are reasonable. In the case of
Agency. Inc. v. Reichert. 784 P.2d 1210, (Utah 1989) these were outlined.
Several Factors to consider in determining a reasonable attorneys fee are
the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys presenting the
case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee
customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the amount
involved in the case and the result attained, and the experience of the
attorneys involved.

This is a standard case of non-payment of commercial rent. The firm of
Prince, Yeats & Geldzahler handles multitudes of this type of case annually. The
attorneys for the Plaintiff are experienced and as such very efficient. The research
for this case has been done previously with all of the other non-payment of rent
cases. This "boiler plate" memorandum was most is likely already stored in their
computers. Even if Calculated at $150.00 per hour, a high hourly billing amount
for this community, the preparation for this particular summary judgment motion
and memorandum should not take 38.96 hours of time, especially in light of the
caliber of attorneys representing the plaintiff/Appellee. This motion and
memorandum should not have taken more than 10 hours. Therefore the
maximum attorneys fee would be $1500.00.
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It is interesting to note that the result attained is a factor. No result has been
obtained since the case is not over and whether a breach of covenant of good
faith and fair dealing has occurred, has yet to be determined..
Hence, it would appear that there is not sufficient record in the file to show the
basis for the award of attorneys' fees was sufficient to even allow an appellate
review of their reasonableness, let alone whether they were premature.

Point 3.
Did the District Court, in awarding unreasonable attorneys fees to Appellee,
violate Appellant Thomas fs right of equal protection of the law as guaranteed
by Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution and the 14* Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
To allow for the award of attorneys of such magnitude part way through the
case, is a barrier to prevent anyone who is not as economically well off to be
victimized by their opponent and prevented from seeing the case to a final
conclusion. This is a denial of equal protection of the law as guaranteed by
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution and the 14th Amendment to the
Untied States Constitution. By stopping a person from completing the case
because they are ordered to pay the opposing party's attorneys fees prior to the
conclusion of the case, especially when their claim or defense is meritorious, the
Court is violating that person's rights to said equal protection of the law.
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VI, CONCLUSION
As stated, the award of attorney's fees in the as contained in 19.02 of the Lease
Agreement, requires that the party seeking reimbursement for attorneys fees to be
successful. To determine whether Appellee is successful, the case must come to a
final conclusion. It has not. Therefore the award of attorneys fees by the District
Court is a serious abuse of discretion.
Further, even if the attorneys' fees could be awarded, the amount of the
attorneys fees awarded is without sufficient foundation in the record. Further, the
amount awarded appears to be extreme in light of the simplicity of the summary
judgment motion for non- payment of monies due under a commercial lease, the
expertise of the Appellee's attorneys, especially in efficiency, and the customary
fees for this type of legal action in the community. The amount of $5,488.00 for
this work is extreme.
The award of attorneys fees part way through the case has a very "chilling"
effect upon the Appellant completing the case. This "chilling" effect deprives
Mr. Thomas of equal protection under the law. Both the Utah Constitution and
the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution provide for equal protection
under the law. Therefore the award of attorneys fees prematurely results in Guy
Thomas being deprived of equal protection under the law.
Dated this 13th day of March, 1998.

J. KHrfT HOLLAND
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Guy Thomas
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 13th day March, 1998,1 caused to be served
two true and correct copies of the OPENING BRIEF OF DEFENDANTAPPELLANT GUY THOMAS by hand delivery to the addressees below:
Robert S. Young
David K. Broadbent
PRINE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
175 East 400 South, suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Robert L. Booker
BOOKER & ASSOCIATES
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